Thoughts on "Operational Research" by Blackett (1950), Chris Ryan
"Operational Research", P. M. S. Blackett, Operational Research Quarterly (later, the Journal of Operational Research Society) March, 1950, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 3-6. [link]
My personal exploration:
This article marks a significant moment in the history of Operations Research (OR): it is the very first piece published in the first-ever academic journal dedicated to the field. Fittingly, it is authored by Patrick Blackett, one of the most prominent and influential figures in the early development of OR.
In the article, Blackett sets out to answer three foundational questions:
(i) Is OR scientific?
(ii) Is OR new?
(iii) If so, in what way?
To address the first question, Blackett draws on the prevailing definition of the time, popularized by Kittell's article in Science, which defined OR as “a scientific method for providing executive departments with a quantitative basis.” Under this framing, OR is, by definition, a science. But Blackett goes further, arguing that OR also meets deeper criteria for scientific inquiry, involving observation and reasoning—hallmarks of what he considers genuine science.
More provocative is Blackett’s treatment of the second question: is OR new? Unlike many others writing at the time, he does not attempt to distinguish OR sharply from earlier approaches to scientific decision-making, such as Frederick Winslow Taylor's Scientific Management movement. Instead, he seems more interested in differentiating OR from laboratory science or internal decision-support efforts conducted within executive departments themselves.
Blackett locates OR’s novelty not in what it studies, but in how and where it is practiced. As he writes (page 4):
“In my view, the element of relative novelty lies not so much in the material to which the scientific method is applied as in the level at which the work is done, in the comparative freedom of the investigators to seek out their own problems, and in the direct relation of the work to the possibilities of executive action.”
This framing highlights OR’s grounded character—its closeness to action and its embeddedness within the flow of executive decision-making.
Blackett introduces an additional definition of OR, attributing it to “another writer” (unnamed), which further reinforces this idea. According to this view, “operational research is social science done in collaboration with and on behalf of executives.” The emphasis is on proximity to practice: research carried out with decision-makers—those who execute decisions—not merely for academic interest or abstract theory.
This proximity, however, does not diminish the role of the operations researcher as a researcher. Blackett is clearly at pains to distinguish operations researchers from ordinary staff within executive ranks. A key feature of OR, in his view, is that researchers must have the freedom to identify and pursue problems of interest—not just to answer the questions posed to them by executives. He stresses this point with a telling quote from page 5:
“... one of the clearest lessons of our war experience [was] that the really big successes of operational research groups are often achieved by the discovery of problems which had not hitherto been recognised as significant.”
To enable this kind of discovery, operations researchers must be embedded in executive environments but not beholden to executive orders. They must be granted access to operations and given the authority to investigate freely. Blackett describes this ideal arrangement vividly:
“... one of the best methods of achieving this is to put the group in close personal contact with the executives and let them watch them at work—that is, let them watch the decisions being made and give them the right to ask such questions as, ‘Why did you decide to do A rather than B?’ or to intervene with the executives thus, ‘Next month you will have to decide between course of action D, E. or F. You will probably have no firm data on which to choose and you will, in all probability, have to guess which course is best. We think that possibly we may be able to help you by analysing quantitatively the effects of these possible actions. But we must have access to all the available facts and have authority to go and collect those that are not available.’”
Importantly, Blackett emphasizes that while operations researchers must work closely with executives, they must not become executives themselves. Their role is to explore, investigate, and advise—not to decide. Still, this advisory role requires conviction. He writes (page 5):
“... when an operational research worker comes to some conclusion that affects executive action, he should only recommend to the executives that the action should be taken if he himself is convinced that he would take the action, were he the executive authority. It is useless to bother a busy executive with a learned resume of all possible courses of action and with the conclusion that it is not possible to decide between them. Silence here is better than academic doubt.”
This attitude highlights a key distinction between conventional “positive” science and operational research. The latter is not about detached explanation—it is purpose-driven. It is a teleological science, aimed at improving decisions that advance specific goals. Notably, Blackett never calls these goals into question. The operations researcher, in his conception, does not occupy an ethical or critical role in assessing the executive’s objectives. Instead, the researcher assumes alignment with those objectives and focuses on improving the means of achieving them.
How is such alignment cultivated? Through close, even intimate, relationships with decision-makers. Blackett recalls the war-time setting as an ideal example:
“have close personal relationships with the executive—the situation during the war when they often shared the same mess was ideal” (page 6).
The essay concludes with a discussion of the qualifications necessary for someone to become an operations researcher. According to Blackett (page 6), the required qualities include:
• “ability to take a broad view of a problem, so that important factors will not be missed”
• “some knowledge of statistical methods” (which may be possessed by some, but not all, members of a team)
• “specialist knowledge ... is desirable but can be acquired”
• “a high degree of general intelligence and enthusiasm for the work”
• “the right personality is vital, so that during an investigation the operational research worker can obtain the confidence of the men on the job, and at the end, can put his conclusions across to the executive”
Blackett also addresses a common misconception about the role:
“I entirely repudiate the notion that operational research scientists are necessarily in any sense more intelligent or clever than the executives. They are usually not, but they are differently trained and are doing a different job.”
Nowhere in this discussion does Blackett place special emphasis on mathematical prowess. If anything, the qualifications lean heavily toward soft skills, broad thinking, and the ability to gain trust and communicate effectively.
This emphasis makes sense within the organizational context Blackett envisions: a team of researchers with high status but no formal decision-making power, embedded within operations, trusted by executives, and free to roam, ask questions, collect data, and offer recommendations. But it also raises questions about how such roles gain and maintain their status. If qualifications stress personality and intelligence over formal expertise, on what basis is the researcher trusted?
Moreover, Blackett’s conception largely leaves out the academic dimension of OR. There is little sense that the operations researcher is based at a university, engaged in peer-reviewed publication, or aiming to contribute to a generalizable scientific literature. This is particularly interesting, given that the essay appears in the very first academic journal devoted to Operational Research.
Blackett’s conception seems less like an academic model and more like a precursor to the modern-day role of an operations consultant. It would be worth investigating the state of management and operations consulting around the time Blackett was writing, to see how his vision compares.